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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW- DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE WASHINGTON SUPREME COURT UPHOLDS STATE ANTISPAMMING LAW.- Washington v. Heckel, 24 P.3d 404 (Wash. 2001),
cert. denied, 70 U.S.L.W. 3193 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2001) (No. 01-469).
The Internet has introduced Americans to a host of new terms 1 and
given new meanings to some old words. 2 Originally a lunch meat, the
lexicographers of cyberspace have adopted the word "spam" to refer to
unwanted commercial email messages. 3 In 1999, Washington state
adopted legislation designed to regulate spam, 4 joining seventeen other
states that have passed similar laws. 5 In State v. Heckel, 6 the Washington Supreme Court held that Washington's law did not violate the
dormant comm~rce clause. 7 The court's analysis sidestepped the major question presented by the case and allowed the court to avoid
weighing the cost of potentially unconstitutional legislation by simply
attaching a negative label to a burdened activity. Other courts grappling with dormant commerce clause challenges to state Internet regulations should not follow the Heckel court's analysis.
The Washington law makes it illegal to send two categories of messages from an email account within the state or to "an electronic mail
address that the sender knows, or has reason to know, is held by a
Washington resident. "8 The first is a message that masks the identity
of the sender. 9 The second is a message that "[c]ontains false or misleading information in the subject line." 10 Jason Heckel, an Oregon
resident who sent 1oo,ooo to 1,ooo,ooo spam messages each week sellI Email, download, website, hacker, domain name, gif, peri, and web address, to name just a
few.
2 Flame, browse, cookie, buffer, and virus, for example.
3 See Washington v. Heckel, 24 P.3d 404, 406 n.1 (Wash. 2001) (discussing the history of the
term "spam").
4 See WASH. REV. CODE§§ 19-I90.005-I9.I90.0JO (1999).
S See http://www.spamlaws.com/state/index.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2001).
6 24 P.3d 404 (Wash. 2001), cert. denied, 70 U.S.L.W. 3193 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2001) (No. 01-469).
7 I d. at 406. The dormant commerce clause refers to a body of judge-made Jaw that has been
inferred from the "great silences of the Constitution." H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336
U.S. 525, 535 (1949) Oackson, J.). Since its 1852 decision in Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S.
(12 How.) 299 (1852), the Supreme Court has held that certain kinds of state regulation violate the
Constitution because they impinge on the congressional prerogative to regulate interstate commerce. The Court has generally struck down state laws that on their face discriminate against out
of state business. In addition, the Court has held that the negative effects of nondiscriminatory
state regulation on commerce occurring outside the state may sometimes violate the constitution.
See generally I LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-2, at 1029-43
(3d ed. 2ooo).
8 WASH. REV. CODE. § I9.190.o20(I). Violations of the prohibitions are made a violation of
the Washington Consumer Protection Act. I d. § I9.I90.030. Under the act, a violator can be sued
for treble damages in a private suit, id. § 19.86.090, and be fined up to $2oo,ooo, id. § 19.86.140.
9 Id. §§ I9.190.020(I)(a), 19.190.0JO(I)(a).
10 Id. §§ I9.I90.020(l)(b), l9.190.0JO(I)(b).
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ing an online booklet entitled "How to Profit from the Internet," became the first person prosecuted under the law. 11 Generally, email
messages contain a "return path" identifying the sender, but Heckel altered this information. Some Washington recipients of Heckel's messages complained to the Washington Attorney General's office. 12 After
Heckel ignored an initial request by the State Attorney General's office
to stop, the State filed suit, alleging violations of its anti-spamming
law. 13
Heckel moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Washington anti-spamming law violated the dormant commerce clause, and
the state cross-filed for summary judgment. 14 On March ro, 2ooo, Superior Court Judge Palmer issued a terse, handwritten, 15 one-page
opinion. 16 He concluded that "the statute in question here violates the
Federal Interstate Commerce Clause of the united states [sic] Constitution" because it "is unduly restrictive and burdensome." 17 The state
then petitioned the Washington Supreme Court for direct review. 18
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Owen rejected the lower
court's decision and held that the law did not run afoul of the dormant
commerce clause. 19 The court took a two-step approach to its constitutional analysis, looking first to whether the statute discriminated on
its face against non-Washington residents. Finding that it did not, 20
11 Heckel, 24 P.3d at 406; see also Spamming and Spoofing: Washington v. Jason Heckel d/b/a
Natural Instincts, at http://www.netlitigation.com/netlitigation/cases/heckelcase.htm (last visited
Dec. 2, 2001).
12 See Heckel, 24 P.3d at 406--o7.
!3 ld. at 407. The state also contended that Heckel violated the Consumer Protection Act by
failing to provide a usable return email address. ld.; see also WASH. REv. CODE § 19.86.020
(prohibiting "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce").
Heckel's practice was to open anonymous email accounts with free services such as Juno or Hotmail. He would then send spam messages from these accounts. When the accounts became deluged with angry responses, Heckel would simply open a new account. See Heckel, 24 P.3d at
407--o8. This practice is not specifically forbidden by the state anti-spamming law, but the Attorney General argued that it constituted a deceptive practice in violation of the Consumer Protection Act. See id. at 408. The lower court's opinion addressed neither the constitutionality nor the
merits of this theory, and the Washington Supreme Court did not discuss it. See State v. Heckel,
No. 98-2-25480-7 SEA, 2000 WL 979720, at *1 (Wash. Super. Mar. 10, 2000); see also Heckel, 24
P.3d at 413.
14 Heckel, 24 P.3d at 408.
15 Max P. Ochoa, Legislative Note: Recent State Laws Regulating Unsolicited Electronic Mail,
16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 459, 469 (2000).
16 Heckel, 2ooci WL 979720.
1 7 /d. at*I.
18 Heckel, 24 P.3d at 406.
19 /d. at 413.
20 /d. at 409 ("The Act applies evenhandedly to in-state and out-of-state spammers: 'No person' may transmit the proscribed commercial e-mail messages .... Thus, just as the statute applied to Heckel, an Oregon resident, it is enforceable against a Washington business engaging in
the same practices." (citation omitted)).
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the court applied the balancing analysis required under Pike v. Bruce
Church, lnc., 21 weighing the incidental burdens of the statute on interstate commerce against the statute's local benefits. 22
According to the court, Washington's statute protected three local
groups: internet service providers (ISPs), 23 owners of allegedly spoofed
domain names, and email users. 24 The court concluded that a mass of
deceptive spam messages could clog the ISPs' servers, reducing the
quality of service for other customers. 25 Disgruntled recipients may
respond to deceptively packaged spam messages, 26 deluging the hapless owner of the misappropriated domain name with thousands of
messages. 27 Finally, deceptive spam inconveniences recipients. 28
Having concluded that the law protected legitimate local interests,
the court next analyzed the burdens imposed on interstate commerce.
According to the court, "the only burden the Act places on spammers
is the requirement of truthfulness, a requirement that does not burden
commerce but actually facilitates it by eliminating fraud and deception."29 The court went on to fault the lower court for looking to the
costs that the act imposed on noncompliance, rather than to the costs
imposed by compliance with the statute: 30 "This focus on the burden
397 u.s. 137 (1970).
Heckel, 24 P.3d at 409. Pike held that "[w]here the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental,
it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to
the putative local benefits." Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
23 An ISP allows individuals to connect to the Internet and receive email messages. The ISP
has special computers, known as "servers," which are connected to the network of communication
lines that make up the Internet. Individuals can then use their personal computers to connect to
these servers and, via the servers, to the Internet as a whole. In addition, the servers often provide space to store email messages until patrons can download them to their personal computers.
24 Heckel, 24 P.3d at 409.
25 I d. In addition, the court noted that "[o]perational costs ... increase as ISPs hire more customer service representatives to field spam complaints and more system administrators to detect
accounts being used to send spam." I d. at 410.
26 Each email address contains a domain name indicating where the message originated.
Thus, the email address "lhand@lawreview.org" has the domain name "lawreview.org," showing
that this email account is housed on the law review computer server. It is possible electronically
to alter the apparent domain name of an email address so that a message originating from one
computer appears to be coming from a different computer. The Washington Jaw forbids this
practice. See WASH. REV. CODE § I9,190.020(1)(a) (1999).
27 Heckel, 24 P.3d at 410 (relating the story of a domain owner whose computer was shut
down for three days by replies to deceptive spam).
28 ld.
29 I d. at 411 (citations omitted).
JO ld. By "noncompliance" the court referred to the costs of continuing to send legal but deceptive spam to non-Washington residents, which necessitates the difficult task of identifying
which email addresses belong to Washington residents. See id. Note that this is not really noncompliance because sending deceptive email messages to non-Washington residents does not violate the Washington statute. By "compliance" the court meant sending only nondeceptive spam
messages to both Washington and non-Washington residents. See id. This is really overcompli2!
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of noncompliance is contrary to the approach taken in the Pike balancing test, where the United States Supreme Court assessed the cost
of compliance with the challenged statute."31 The court rejected
Heckel's claim that because other states had slightly different antispamming provisions, Washington was subjecting him to inconsistent
and contradictory laws, noting that "the inquiry under the dormant
commerce clause is not whether the states have enacted different antispam statutes but whether those differences create compliance costs
that are clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."32
In Heckel, the court neglected the difficult issues posed by the
Washington anti-spamming law by failing to recognize the full costs
imposed by the statute. The court's conclusory characterization of
Heckel's activities as "deceptive" and "fraudulent" masked deeper
complexity concerning spam and the dormant commerce clause. The
difficulty of the "weighing" required by current doctrine 33 makes it all
the more important for courts to adopt a coherent framework within
which to carry out their analysis. The Heckel court drew on recent
scholarship to adopt such a framework but ultimately failed to appreciate the full contours of the problem posed by state Internet regulations.
In an article relied on by the Heckel court, Professors Jack L. Goldsmith and Alan 0. Sykes offer a way of conceptualizing the Pike balancing test. 34 They argue that markets oversupply activities that do

ance, since it includes messages that conform to the statute even when the statute does not apply,
that is, when sending messages to non-Washington residents.
31 I d. aqu (citations omitted).
32 I d. at 412. Heckel also claimed that the law could subject him to liability for activity occurring completely outside the state of Washington. I d. He offered the hypothetical of a Washington
resident who downloaded her email while in another state, arguing that applying the statute in
such a case would impose liability for completely extraterritorial conduct. I d. The court avoided
this issue by noting that "the hypothetical mistakenly presumes that the Act must be construed to
apply to Washington residents when they are out of the state, a construction that creates a jurisdictional question not at issue in this case." I d.
33 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). The Supreme Court held in Pike that,
"[w]here the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its
effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on
such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." Pike, 397 U.S. at
142. Since Pike, the Supreme Court has struggled to conceptualize what this balancing requires.
See, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987) (upholding a law designed to
discourage corporate takeovers); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 45 7 U.S. 624 (1982) (striking down a law
designed to discourage corporate takeovers). Justice Scalia has criticized Pike, noting that while
the Court refers to its adjudication as balancing, "the scale analogy is not really appropriate, since
the interests on both sides are incommensurate. It is more like judging whether a particular line
is longer than a particular rock is heavy." Benedix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., 486 U.S.
888, 897 (1988) (Scalia,]., dissenting).
34 See Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan 0. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce Clause,
uo YALE L.]. 785 (2001); see also Heckel, 24 P.3d at 411.
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not fully internalize their social costs. 35 Government can solve this
problem by imposing a "tax"36 on the activity that forces those engaging in it to internalize its social costs. 37 When these externalities cross
state lines, however, state governments may have an incentive to overregulate externality-producing behavior in other states because their
own citizens are less likely to bear the increased costs. 38 When states
impose a "tax" that exceeds the activity's social costs there is a net loss
to society. 39 The professors claim dormant commerce clause balancing
should be understood in terms of policing these cross-border "taxes" to
ensure that they do not exceed the social costs of the activity they aim
to curb. 40 Their article explicitly discusses the case,41 and the Washington Supreme Court borrowed much of its argument from the article.42 According to Goldsmith and Sykes, the Washington law imposes
virtually no costs because "[c]ompliance with the various antispam
statutes is easy compared to noncompliance, which requires the
spammer to incur the costs of forging, re-mailing, and the like."43
While the conceptual framework posed by Goldsmith and Sykes is
promising, their neat solution is problematic for two reasons. First, its
definition of costs is too simple. The only cost considered is the actual
effort involved in complying with the statute; however, any realistic
analysis must also consider the opportunity costs of foregoing all deceptive email messages, not simply those prohibited by Washington
law. This is because, given the current state of technology, it is virtually impossible to determine the geographic location of any particular
email address. 44 In the face of the Washington law, nonresident
spammers must either comply with Washington's requirements in all
of the spam that they send (and thus forgo legal but deceptive
spamming of non-Washingtonians) or run the risk of being brought
35 Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 34, at 798-99. See generally ROBERT S. PINDYCK &
DANIELL. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 624-26 (3d ed. 1995) (discussing the market inefficiencies resulting from negative externalities).
36 In this context "tax" refers to so-called Pigouvian taxes, which are not revenue raising devices but rather government-imposed costs on socially costly activity. There is no reason that a
Pigouvian tax must take the form of an actual tax. Fines, transfers (that is, tort judgments), and
other mechanisms that impose increased costs could all serve the same function. See Goldsmith &
Sykes, supra note 34, at 8oo.
37 I d. at 8oo.
38 I d. at 8o4-os.
39 ld.
40 ld.
4! ld. at 793--94, 8r8-19. The article appeared after the lower court's decision, but before its
appeal.
42 See Heckel, 24 P.3d at 411.
43 Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 34, at 819.
44 Some software programs and internet services purport to identify the geographic location of
particular domain names using a variety of techniques. However, such techniques are costly and
inaccurate at best. See Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 34, at 8xo-x2.
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into Washington's courts. The Heckel court implies that these costs
can be ignored because the lost profits result from "deception and
fraud."45 Yet the fact that deceptive email is an unseemly way to
make a living does not imply that one can ignore the costs of discontinuing it. To do so substitutes name-calling for analysis.
The second problem is that the Goldsmith and Sykes analysis assumes that all jurisdictions share Washington's view of deceptive
spam. Making a living off of deceptive spam imposes externalities on
others. Yet states have long made the decision to favor businesses by
allowing them to impose such externalities. 46 Most jurisdictions in the
United States have not adopted anti-spamming laws, and such inaction may have "been none the less a choice [by those states]."47 To the
extent that this inactivity reflects a less negative view of deceptive
spamming, 48 imposing a "tax" on such messages will result in a decrease in net welfare.
The court could still have concluded that the savings to ISPs and
email users were greater than the full costs imposed on spammers like
Heckel. Likewise, it could have concluded that, even in the absence of
benefits to out-of-state residents who are not adverse to deceptive
spam, the benefits realized by Washington's spam-hating residents
were so great as to result in a net benefit to society. While there is
something surreal about the idea that courts have the resources to justify such empirical claims,49 these claims seem potentially reasonable
in light of common experience.
45 See Heckel, 24 P.Jd at 819. The deceptive messages are not fraudulent in any meaningful
legal sense. The purpose of deceptive spam is to advertise a product. Ultimately, Heckel's profits
came from voluntary and fully informed transactions. His deceptive messages simply tricked
people into opening them, thus defrauding people out of at most a few seconds of their time. Cf
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§§ 221, 310 (1965) (discussing tortious frauds). Any costs
his activity imposed on ISPs would be legally conceptualized as a nuisance or perhaps as a trespass. Cf eBay v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d ross, 1069-70 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (suggesting
that online behavior that threatened to crash a computer server constituted trespass to chattels).
46 Cf MORTON}. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 178o-186o, at
63-108 (1977) (arguing that nineteenth-century courts provided wholesale subsidies to nascent
industries by allowing them to externalize costs through loosened tort rules). For example, some
jurisdictions forbid soliciting people in their cars because it inconveniences drivers and imposes
on their privacy. Other jurisdictions allow such business techniques. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch.
316.2055 (2001) (prohibiting the throwing of advertising material into any motor vehicle on a public roadway).
47 Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928) (suggesting that state inaction may be the result
of a political or policy choice).
48 Admittedly, this may be a less than realistic assumption. On the other hand, the alternative
is for courts to divine what the people of another jurisdiction "really" think about a given issue.
Given this alternative, the assumption - however unrealistic in particular cases - seems justified.
49 Cf Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 610 (1997) (Thomas, ]., dissenting) (arguing that "the morass of our negative Commerce Clause case law only
serves to highlight the need to abandon that failed jurisprudence"). Justices on both ends of the
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However, reaching the "right" result in this case does not excuse the
flaws in the court's reasoning. The Heckel court's approach to the
Pike test is dangerous because it avoids weighing the costs of potentially unconstitutional legislation by simply attaching a negative label
to a burdened ~ctivity. Far from providing the kind of efficiency
promised by the Goldsmith and Sykes economic model of the dormant
commerce clause, such analysis would potentially allow states to avoid
proper scrutiny for their laws. Other courts grappling with state Internet regulations and the dormant commerce clause would do well to
engage in a more complete consideration of costs, rather than using pejorative labels as a conceptual shortcut.

ideological spectrum have expressed doubt about the ability of the Court to answer the questions
posed by the Pike test. Justice Scalia has suggested that "[ w]bile it bas become standard practice
... to consider ... whether the burden on commerce imposed by a state statute 'is clearly excessive in relation to .the putative local benefits,' such an inquiry is ill suited to the judicial function
and should be undertaken rarely if at all." CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 95
(1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137,
142 (1970)). Writing in the same vein, Justice Stevens bas argued that "speculation about ... real
world economic effects ... is beyond our institutional competence." Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy,
519 U.S. 278, 315 (1997) (Stevens,]., dissenting). Looking at the complex empirical questions involved in a proper analysis of the costs and benefits of the Jaw at issue in Heckel, the position of
these jurists has a great deal of appeal. Indeed, Goldsmith and Sykes express skepticism on this
point, arguing that "there is a growing consensus that courts ... are ill-suited to make the many
difficult value judgments that the balancing test requires .... These concerns have particular valence in the Internet context ... [where] courts have failed properly to identify and weigh the
costs and benefits of state Internet regulations." Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 34, at 820.

